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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN USING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STEPHEN J. HADLEY*
In this address, I will discuss the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
security policy. While I will focus on the future, I want to begin by
noting a few things about the past. There are two serious misconcep-
tions reflected in the public debate on the role of nuclear weapons.
The first misconception is that nothing has changed with respect
to U.S. nuclear policy and the structure of its nuclear arsenal since
the end of the Cold War. In reality, important developments did oc-
cur during the Bush administration at the end of the Cold War.
For example, there was a major change in national strategy that
dramatically reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our deterrent
policy. In July 1990, NATO heads of government first called nuclear
weapons "weapons of last resort."1
In addition to this change in policy, a shift in the deployment of
nuclear weapons occurred during the Bush administration. On 27
September 1991 President Bush announced that he would withdraw
from the field and would destroy the vast majority of U.S. theater nu-
clear weapons including nuclear artillery, short-range nuclear ballistic
missiles, and naval tactical nuclear cruise missiles and bombs. On 5
October 1991 President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union
would take comparable action
At the same time, President Bush took all U.S. strategic nuclear
bombers off alert status. In other words, the bombers would no
longer sit on airstrips, loaded with nuclear bombs, ready to take off at
a moment's notice President Gorbachev announced that the mobile
Soviet SS-24 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) would be
confined to garrison, a permanently defined military post, and would
*Stephen Hadley is a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner in Washington, D.C. and for-
mer Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.
1. See Thorn Shanker, A Peaceful German Offering, Ci. TRIB., July 15, 1990, at 5.
2. See Serge Schmemann, Gorbachev Matches U.S. on Nuclear Cuts and Goes Further on
Strategic Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at 1.
3. See Patrick E. Tyler, Bush's Arms Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,1991, at All.
24 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW
no longer operate over the Soviet railroad network.4
President Bush also called for the Soviet Union and the United
States to cooperate in reviewing the command and control proce-
dures that protect against an accidental or unauthorized launch of
their respective nuclear weapons.5 In the fall of 1992, the United
States completed a review of its own forces, and took a number of
measures to increase safety and control over its nuclear systems.
6
Finally, on 3 January 1993, Russia and the United States signed
the START II treaty, which, when fully implemented, will reduce the
levels of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 3,000 and
3,500 per side.7 These reductions will eliminate the threat from the
most destabilizing element of those forces-multiple-warhead land-
based ICBMs, such as the SS-18.' Together START I and START II
will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides by
about seventy-five percent from Cold War levels.9
Major changes have been made in U.S. nuclear strategy and
force posture. Although further adjustments may be made, it is sim-
ply untrue to suggest that we currently encounter the same nuclear
strategy and force posture as during the Cold War.
The second serious misconception in the recent public debate is
that reliance on nuclear weapons as part of the U.S. national defense
strategy is "irresponsible" and "immoral." This suggestion is mis-
guided because from the beginning, the purpose of nuclear weapons
was to deter war and prevent loss of life. In fact, nuclear weapons
were intended to deter not only nuclear war, but the kind of massive
conventional wars of World War I and World War II. Ironically, it
was precisely the enormous and terrifying destructive power of nu-
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clear weapons-the basis for their alleged "irresponsibility" or
"immorality"-that made them so effective in this role.
Even critics must acknowledge that the security arrangements
developed after World War II, largely dependent upon nuclear
weapons, were successful in giving us a Europe that has been free for
fifty years from the major warfare that twice afflicted the continent in
the first half of this century. Under the protection of nuclear deter-
rence, Europe has pursued a policy of economic and political integra-
tion that has put to rest age-old antagonisms and centuries of conflict
between countries such as France and Germany. Nuclear deterrence
also helped to hold off a Communist Soviet Union until the internal
contradictions of that regime brought it down. In summary,
"morality" must be judged in part by its effects, and if judged by
these results, nuclear deterrence was a highly moral and responsible
national security policy.
I mention this ancient history for two reasons. First, to say that a
security policy based on nuclear weapons was "irresponsible" and
"immoral" from the outset is to accuse the United States government
of pursuing a policy that was irresponsible and immoral. Such a seri-
ous and false accusation against a democratic government destroys
public confidence in our institutions and our leaders. Second, there
are many men and women, both military and civilian, who for over
five decades have devoted their professional lives to building, de-
ploying, and integrating nuclear forces into a successful deterrence
strategy. At the same time, these individuals successfully manage the
nuclear weapons and their attendant safety and security risks. These
men and women make a significant contribution to our nation, and
they deserve better than the suggestion that they are somehow com-
plicitous in an immoral or irresponsible policy.
So much for the past. What about the future? Why do we need
nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world? What is wrong with
"zero nukes" anyway?
In answering this question, we need to focus on the motivation
behind the question: what are we trying to achieve? If the motiva-
tion is to eliminate nuclear weapons because they are somehow
"immoral" or "irresponsible," then the effort is wrong-headed and
dangerous. However, if the motivation is to enhance the national se-
curity of both the United States and its allies, then the issue is
whether eliminating nuclear weapons will achieve this result. The
resolution to this issue is problematic.
We must acknowledge that the goal of no nuclear weapons is
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unachievable; nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated. Even if all nu-
clear weapons were destroyed today, the possibility of their reap-
pearing in a crisis will cast a shadow over the national security policy
of every nation, and over international politics. Nuclear weapons can
be reproduced and deployed without detection in a relatively short
time. In short, the genie is out of the bottle; nuclear weapons cannot
be un-invented.
Nations acquire nuclear weapons because they either fear their
neighbors or want to coerce them. In a world of virtually no de-
ployed nuclear weapons, the possession of a handful of these weap-
ons will transform a country such as Iran, Iraq, or Libya not just into
a regional player, but into a global power. Indeed, the fewer nuclear
weapons actually deployed in the world, the greater the incentive for
nations and terrorist groups to acquire them.
Further, as the Iraq situation has shown, our ability to detect,
much less prevent, the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons is
exceedingly suspect. We learned in the Gulf War that Iraq was much
further along in the development of nuclear weapons than the world
community ever contemplated."° Moreover, the United Nations'
most intrusive inspection regime since the dawn of the nuclear age
has been unable to guarantee that all vestiges of Iraq's nuclear weap-
ons program and the associated delivery systems, have been elimi-
nated." Thus, because we cannot be confident that the world will
ever be, to use the phrase of some in the recent debate, permanently
"devoid of nuclear weapons,"' 2 some nations, such as the United
States, must continue to possess them to deter their acquisition or use
by others.
It is often an unstated premise in the current debate that if nu-
clear weapons are needed at all, they are needed only to deter the
nuclear weapons of others. I am not sure this unstated premise is
true. As General Homer pointed out, this is not why we got into the
nuclear business. In fact, one of the lessons other countries have
drawn from the Gulf War is that no nation should even consider a
confrontation with the United States military without having a
10. See Michele E. Martin, The Changing Role of the United Nations: Halting Nuclear
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weapon of mass destruction at its disposal, be it nuclear, chemical, or
biological. They drew this lesson after observing the overwhelming
conventional non-nuclear military capability that General Homer
and others so visibly demonstrated on the Gulf War battlefield.
A number of commentators have pointed out that during the
Gulf War the United States never made serious preparations to use
nuclear weapons in response to a potential Iraqi chemical or biologi-
cal weapons threat." Though those who argue that a U.S. president
would never order the use of nuclear weapons in response to a
chemical or biological weapons attack may be correct, uncertainty on
this point contributed to the Iraqi decision not to use these weapons
against U.S. forces. While other considerations were present, a Na-
tional Defense University study, based on interviews with U.S. poli-
cymakers and information from Iraqi defectors, indicates uncertainty
about whether the United States would use nuclear weapons contrib-
uted to deterring Saddam Hussein from using chemical and biological
weapons.'4 The question in this world of biological and chemical
weapons proliferation, especially where such proliferation has proven
difficult to control, is whether we need to retain the option of using
nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes.
This does not mean that we cannot make substantial and recip-
rocal reductions in the number of deployed nuclear weapons. But to
enhance the peace and security of the United States and its allies, we
must concurrently make substantial progress in a number of other ar-
eas. For example, we must improve our current measures to verify
nuclear weapon deactivation and disposal, and our ability to prevent
and protect against undetected cheating in a world of radically few
nuclear weapons. We must make progress in resolving the underly-
ing security concerns and regional tensions that cause countries to
seek nuclear weapons. We need more extensive and intrusive verifi-
cation and inspection regimes for all weapons of mass destruction.
Export control regimes must be more stringent and must have real
sanctions for violators. In addition, it is imperative to have an inter-
national political consensus and a firm legal foundation that would
13. See William M. Arkin, Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1996, at 3, 10.
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support military action to eliminate or disrupt covert weapons of
mass destruction and efforts to acquire them. We need a counter-
proliferation program to give us the military capability to carry out
such action, as well as enhanced passive defense measures for our
troops if they should come up against an enemy that is armed with
chemical or biological weapons. Finally, we should deploy active de-
fenses that can counter the means of delivering these weapons
whether by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or some other means.
This is a big agenda. It will require significant expenditures in
addition to the substantial cost of eliminating nuclear weapons. But
this is the agenda we must pursue to move toward a world of radically
few nuclear weapons, or even to contemplate eliminating them. The
real division in the current nuclear debate is between those who de-
mand the instant elimination of all nuclear weapons and those of us
who say, "Wait a minute. We have a lot of hard work to do first." It
is an issue of priority and timing. If we are going to even consider
radically reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons, then we
have to put a lot of effort into the goals mentioned above. Moving to
a world of radically fewer nuclear weapons is less an issue of aspira-
tion than an issue of perspiration. We must put our efforts into im-
plementing an agenda that would permit such reductions in a way
that enhances, rather than diminishes, our security.
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